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BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: LIMITATIONS ON
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE*
DANIEL W.

SHUMAN**

THE

MAJORITY OF the rules of evidence that bear
upon psychiatric and psychological evidence concern
its probative value.' For example, when a psychiatrist is
required to describe her mental status examination of a
patient or when a psychologist is asked to explain the validity of certain psychological tests he administered as a
condition of their admissibility, the primary concern is
whether this evidence meets a minimum threshold of probative value. Is a mental status examination an accurate
vehicle to gauge the mental capacity of a patient and was
it administered in a manner likely to maximize its accuracy? Is a particular psychological test a valid diagnostic
technique and was it properly administered? A negative
answer to these questions reflects on the probative value
of the potential evidence. One set of evidence rules, however, closes the door on psychiatric and psychological evidence for reasons unrelated to its probative value. Rules
of relational privilege are concerned with preserving the
sanctity of a relationship notwithstanding the probative
* This article is taken from chapter 10 of Professor Shuman's forthcoming

book,

PSYCHIATRIC AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE,

which will be published by

Shepards/McGraw-Hill.
** Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Dallas,
Texas.
I The rules governing relevance and its limits, experts, hearsay and authentication all have as their core concern the probative value of evidence.
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value of the evidence that might be obtained from the
relationship.
The professions themselves have adopted codes which
address these same concerns and describe the circumstances under which members of the profession should
keep professional secrets and circumstances which may
justify disclosure. 2 These codes describe the professional's duty of confidentiality and limit gratuitous disclosures of patient communications to a narrowly described
set of circumstances that involve a risk to the patient or
the public.3 The codes may have legal significance in actions for professional discipline 4 or breach of privacy following an unjustified disclosure of confidential
information by a psychiatrist or psychologist. 5 But these
codes do not purport to govern, and arguably as privately
imposed professional norms, could not govern, judicially
compelled disclosure. That is the province of the rules of
evidence and related constitutional considerations
grouped under the head of privilege.
Medical privileges are, in the first instance, largely a
matter of statutory law because the common law did not
recognize a physician-patient privilege. 6 Thus any privilege applicable to psychiatrists or psychologists will, with
limited exception, 7 be a legislative creation. These legislative creations have a common pattern; they describe the
prerequisites for recognition of a privilege, the consequences of its recognition, and exceptions to the
privilege.
Because pyschiatrists as physicians are included within
physician-patient privilege statutes, in those jurisdictions
I

The Principles of Medical Ethics, 246 J. A.M.A. 2187 (1981); ETHICAL STANDARDS
36 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 633 (1981).
3 "A
physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues and of the
health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the Law." The Principlesof Medical Ethics, 246J. A.M.A. 2187-88 (1981).
OF PSYCHOLOGISTS,

4 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2263 (West Supp. 1984).

Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977).
6 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977); Duchess of Kingston's Case,
20 How ST. TRIALS 355, 573 (1776).

7 Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
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possessing no privilege statute exclusively applicable to
psychiatrists, it is necessary to resort to the general physician-patient privilege. Many jurisdictions have adopted
specialized psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychotherapist-patient privileges. These specialized privileges may
exist in lieu of a general physician-patient privilege or in
addition to it, but with different effect.
The traditional concept of practitioners of the healing
arts and their relationship to litigation has changed substantially over the years. Physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists now play many roles in the litigation process.
They may have a therapeutic relationship with a patientlitigant entered into prior to the onset of litigation which
is now of consequence in the litigation. They may have a
non-therapeutic relationship with the patient-litigant and
see him only to assist in their testifying at trial. Or, they
may not have a therapeutic relation with the patient, examine him, or testify at trial and instead function exclusively as the attorney's assistant in preparing the case.
The first situation, the therapeutic relationship, raises
problems of medical privilege - physician, psychiatrist,
psychologist, or psychotherapist-patient privilege. The
latter two situations, both non-therapeutic, raise questions of privilege not of therapist and patient, but of the
attorney and client and the attorney's assistants.
I.
A.

THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

General Rule

Although the common law did not recognize a physician-patient privilege, most state legislatures have now
modified the common law in their states and enacted a
physcian-patient privilege.8 The rationale for these privileges is that they permit the patient to disclose fully and
truthfully his condition to his physician so that he may be
See Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An EmpiricalExamination of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C.L. REV. 893, 907 n.100 (1982) for a chart describing the pattern of medical privileges in the states.
8
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effectively treated. 9 Notwithstanding the suggestions that
these privileges actually play a negligible role in physician-patient relationships and frustrate factual inquiries in
the trial process,' the number of physician-patient privileges has grown substantially over the years. The response to criticisms of these privileges has been, instead,
to interpret the requirements for recognition of a privilege strictly and to find a waiver or exception rather
liberally. "I
The physician-patient privilege statutes from state to
state share certain requirements for recognition of a privilege. There must be a patient, an individual who seeks
out a physician for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment.' 2 The person the patient seeks out for treatment
must be a licensed physician or there must be a reasonable basis for the patient to assume that the individual is a
physician who is licensed to practice medicine.' 3 If it later
appears that the individual sought out by the patient was
not a physician or not currently licensed to practice
medicine, the inquiry will focus on the reasonableness of
the patient's belief that she had consulted a licensed physician. Thus, for example, contacting an individual listed
under the physician listing in the phone book should give
rise to a reasonable belief that the individual was a licensed physician.
Physician is generally defined to include allopathic and
osteopathic physicians without reference to specialty, thus
psychiatrists are included within the definition of physician. Generally not included within the statutory defini9 See, e.g., State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 363 A.2d 143 (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1025 (1975);Jones v. State, 610 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [ist
Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
to Chafee, PrivilegedCommunications: IsJustice Served or Obstructedby Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Ladd, A Modern Code of
Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213 (1942).
11J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 504[01], at 504-09

(1982).
12 State v. Sweet, 142 Vt. 238, 453 A.2d 1131 (1982); State v.Jenkins, 80 Wisc.
2d 426, 259 N.W.2d 109 (1977).
15 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT.. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1966).
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tion of physician are other practitioners of the healing arts
such as psychologists, dentists, nurses, chiropractors, or
pharmacists. 4 Therefore, in the absence of a specialized
privilege applicable to these practitioners or inclusion
under an existing privilege,15 no bar exists to compel judicial disclosure of their confidential communications with
patients. There is a split of authority concerning whether
interns not yet licensed to practice medicine qualify as
6
physicians for the purposes of privilege.'
The communication between physician and patient
sought to be protected by the privilege must be related to
medical treatment and occur during the course of treatment.' 7 Thus, for example, a discussion with one's physician about investment opportunities during an office visit
or a gratuitous remark about one's condition after termination of the relationship would not qualify for protection
under the privilege. Although some states limit the privilege's protection to oral communications or substitutes
for oral communications such as pointing gestures, rather
than all information learned from the patient including
communications and the physician's observations of matters the patient may not intend to communicate, most
8
states now cloak both under the privilege.'
The communications between physician and patient
sought to be protected must have been intended by the
patient to be confidential. It is not necessary for the communication to have taken place in the physician's office to
conclude that it was intended to be confidential and the
fact that the communication occurred in the physician's
office is not a guarantee that it will be found to have been
confidential. A communication in a private setting
outside the physician's office suggests that confidentiality
C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 99, at 246 n.1 (3d ed. 1984).
is See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
14

16 Compare Erieka-Maryland Assurance Co. v. Gray, 121 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
1941) (intern included) with Frederick v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d
585, 57 P.2d 235 (Cal. 1935) (intern excluded).
17 San Francisco v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).

is D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 215, at 599 (1978).
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was intended while a communication in the physician's
waiting room in the presence and hearing of other patients does not suggest that confidentiality was intended.
The presence of someone other than the physician and
patient during the communication was, at one time, generally thought to be inconsistent with confidentiality.
Presently, a more functional approach is usually used in
inquiring about the necessity for the third party's presence. For example, the presence of a parent during the
asexamination of a child,' 9 or a nurse who is needed to
20
sist the physician should not destroy confidentiality.
Inclusion of privileged information within a medical
record does not result in a loss of its privileged status. 2 '
Although many people have access to this information,
the courts have assumed that this recording is a practical
necessity. Additionally, everyone with access to medical
records is part of the treatment team who has a medical
need for this information.
The consequence of the recognition of a physician-patient privilege is that the patient may refuse to permit the
physician's testimony about confidential communications
between them. The physician is not rendered incompetent as a witness generally and thus, even in the absence
of an exception or waiver, she may testify to non-privileged perceptions such as discussions with the patient
before the onset of the physician-patient relationship or
after its termination and non-therapeutic or non-confidential communications during the relationship. Most jurisdictions do not regard the existence of the physicianpatient relationship itself as privileged; thus, the physician
22
may be asked whether and when someone was a patient.
19. Grosslight v. Super. Ct., 72 Cal. App. 2d 501, 140 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1977).

(Mo. 1973); Ostrawski v. Mockridge, 242
20 State v. Scott, 491 S.W.2d 514
Minn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954).
21 Rudnick v. Super. Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603
(1974).
22 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 426
(1983). But see Exparte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1981).
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Waiver of the Privilege

Because the physician-patient privilege is not a rule rendering the physician incompetent as a witness, but a right
of the patient to prevent the physician from testifying as
to certain confidential communications, it may be waived.
However, unless waived or excepted, its effect on the physician's testimony is generally held to continue beyond
the termination of the physician-patient relationship and
even after the death of the patient. 23 When the physician's testimony is sought and the patient is not present, it
should be assumed, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, that the patient did not wish the privilege
waived.24
A waiver of the privilege by the patient may be express
or implied. An express waiver could occur in court, for
example, when the patient notifies the court that he
wishes to waive the privilege, or out of court in an application for health insurance. 5 As with other waivers of
rights, so long as it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,
the waiver will be effective.2 6 Conversely, evidence that
the patient did not understand the waiver language in an
insurance application because it was written in "legalese,"
or failed to comprehend the significance of submitting a
death certificate to an insurance company in support of a
claim for life insurance benefits when no other method of
substantiating a claim exists 27 will defeat the waiver.
When a patient acts in a manner inconsistent with an
intention to maintain the confidentiality of communications, a waiver of the privilege will be implied. This will
occur when the patient publicly discloses the communicaC. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 102, at 253.
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga Co., 59 N.Y.2d 130, 450 N.E.2d
678, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1983).
25 United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 569 n.14 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429
U.S. 820 (1976); Leach v. Millers Life Ins. Co., 400 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1968).
26 In re Pebsworth, 704 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1983); Gaynier v. Johnson, 673
S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1984, no writ).
27 Kelly v. Allegan County Circuit Judge, 382 Mich. 425,
169 N.W.2d 916
(1969).
2

24
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tion with his physician in testimony or elsewhere, 28 or
calls the physician as a witness and examines him as to the
communications. 29 In some jurisdictions, the filing of a
lawsuit in which the issue is the condition for which the
patient was treated by this physician 30 will effect an implied waiver of the privilege.
Another implied waiver is addressed by Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 ' Rule 35 permits the
Id.
People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156, 451 N.E.2d 157, 464 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1983);
State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982).
10See, e.g., San Francisco v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); TEX.
R. EvID. 510 (d)(5).
, FED R. Civ. P. 35. The full text of the rule provides:
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical condition
(including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody
or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in
which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal control. The order may be
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the
person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made.
(b) Report of Examining Physician
(1) If requested by the party against whom an order is made
under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his findings,
including results of all tests made, diagnoses and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition. After delivery the party causing the examination shall be
entitled upon request to receive from the party against whom the
order is made a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition, unless, in the case of a report of
examination of a person not a party, the party shows that he is unable to obtain it. The court on motion may make an order against a
party requiring delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and if a
physician fails or refuses to make a report the court may exclude his
testimony if offered at the trial.
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so
ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other
involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every
other person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in
respect of the same mental or physical condition.
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by agreement
28

29
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court to order a mental or physical examination of a party
or a person in the custody or legal control of a party when
that person's mental or physical condition is in contro2
versy, and good cause for the examination existsY3
The
person examined may request a copy of the report of the
examination, but the request "waives any privilege he may
have in that action or other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who
has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect of
the same mental or physical condition. ' 33 Thus, even if
the filing of the action does not constitute an implied
waiver of the privilege, a waiver will occur if the patient
requests copies of the report from a court ordered
examination.
Another question which arises with regard to both implied and express waivers is the effect of the waiver beyond the communication with the physician. Those
courts that find a waiver without much difficulty also oftentimes give a broad effect to the waiver. These courts
not only permit inquiry into all other relevant communications between the patient and the physician which is not
testified about on direct examination, but also all relevant
communications with other physicians. Conversely, those
same courts which are reluctant to find a waiver will limit
the effect of a waiver to a particular physician when an
implied waiver results from calling the physician as a witness.3 ' Likewise, these courts will construe narrowly these
conditions or treatments they will find related to the present condition when an implied waiver results from instituting litigation related to that condition. 5
of the parties, unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise.
This subdivision does not preclude discovery of a report of an examining physician or the taking of a deposition of the physician in accordance with the provisions of any other rule.

ld.
.2See id.
1 ld. § (b)(2).
31 State v. Olsen, 271 Or. 369, 532 P.2d 230 (1975); Gaynier v. Johnson, 673
S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1984, no writ).
35 Roberts v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. 3d 330, 508 P.2d 309, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1973);
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C. Exceptions to the Privilege
There are certain categories of physician-patient relationships, which, because of their purpose, do not satisfy
the requirements of the physician-patient privilege. This
category includes court-ordered examinations, 36 employment examinations by an employer's physician, 37 and insurance examinations by an insurer's physician. 8 In these
instances the purpose of the relationship is not treatment,
thus the privilege's concern with full disclosure for effective treatment is not served and disclosure to a third person, a court, an employer, or an insurer is necessary to
satisfy the purpose of the relationship. Although these relationships are not privileged, the physician may nevertheless be legally39 or ethically 40 bound to explain the
purpose of the examination and its non-privileged nature
to the patient prior to commencing the examination.
The physician-patient privilege is the result of balancing the sanctity of a physician-patient relationship against
the importance of obtaining the information it may cloak.
Nevertheless, this balancing does not yield universally accepted conclusions, but rather conclusions varying in
form from state to state. As a result, in many states the
physician-patient privilege is inapplicable in certain categories of cases. Not all states, however, except the privilege's, applications in all categories; some recognize very
few exceptions while others recognize many. All states,
however, recognize some exceptions. The categories of
cases in which the physician-patient privilege may not apState ex rel Floyd v. Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St. 2d 27, 377 N.E.2d 794
(1978).
36 See, e.g., State v. Goquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950);Jones v. State,
610 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37 McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
31 Grey v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 698, 133 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1976).
39 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Salas v. State, 592 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.
Civ. App. - Austin 1979, no writ).
40 S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 329 (1967); Report of
the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the CriminalJustice System, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1102 (1978).
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ply include criminal, 4 ' civil commitment, 42 workers' comwill contests,4 4 and child abuse4 5 or
pensation,
46
custody.
Similarly, there are certain activities thought sufficiently
injurious to public health and safety to require that application of the privilege be excepted and reporting to an
appropriate public official required. Included in this category are instances of venereal disease, 4 7 gunshot
wounds, 48 and fetal death. 49 In other jurisdictions, in addition to these specified exceptions, the trial judge is
granted broad authority not to apply the privilege when it
would not serve the interests ofjustice. 50 This type of provision permits the trial court to recognize and balance exceptions based upon the exigencies of a particular case.
II.

THE PYSCHIATRIST, PSYCHOLOGIST, AND
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGES

Although the physician-patient privilege has been much
criticized as being an insignificant factor in physician-patient relationships in which physical problems are the subject of treatment and a significant factor in the exclusion
of probative evidence at trial, 5 ' this same criticism has not
generally been applied to the treatment of mental or emo41 People v. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 651 P.2d 336, 185 Cal. Rpir. 94 (1982);
State v. Soner, 177 NJ. Super. 47, 424 A.2d 1182 (1980).
42 In re Alvarez, 342 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1977).
43 McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 11. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
State ex rel Holman v. Dayton Press, 11 Ohio App. 3d 27, 462 N.E.2d 1243 (1984).
4 Gaynier v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1984, no writ).
45 People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1983);
In re Courtney S., 130 Cal. App. 3d 567, 181 Cal Rptr. 843 (1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53.1 (1981).
4
People v. Florendo, 95 Il. 2d 155, 447 N.E.2d 282 (1983); Perry v. Fiumano,
61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
47 State v. Efird, 309 N.C. 802, 309 S.E.2d 228 (1983).
48 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga Co., 59 N.Y.2d 130, 450 N.E.2d
678, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1983).
49 Schwiman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 44 A.D.2d 482, 355
N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
50 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1981).
51 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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tional problems. 2 Because of the inherently sensitive and
embarrassing nature of mental and emotional problems
and the information that must be disclosed if treatment is
to be effective, it is thought that a privilege is particularly
appropriate for treatment of these types of problems.
This reasoning has led to the adoption of specialized psychiatrist, psychologist and psychotherapist-patient privileges. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example,
originally did not contain a physician-patient privilege,
but did contain a psychotherapist-patient privilege.53
These specialized privilege statutes generally follow the
same pattern as the physician-patient privilege statutes,
but substitute a diffeient sort of therapist who must be
seen to trigger the privilege. Psychiatrist-patient privileges apply to care rendered by a psychiatrist. Non-psychiatric physicians frequently provide counseling for the
mental and emotional aspects of their patients'
problems.54 This care, however, is not included within
the scope of the specialized psychiatrist-patient privilege. 55 Only when the physician is a psychiatrist or devotes a substantial portion of her practice to psychiatry
will this privilege apply. Although some states, for example California, recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege in
addition to a physician-patient privilege, 56 most states
which recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege do not
recognize a general physician-patient privilege.5 7
Psychologist-patient privilege statutes, unlike psychiatrist-patient privilege statutes, do not overlap with physician-patient privilege statutes. Psychologist-patient
52 Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 INn. L.J. 32 (1952); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1960).
53 FED. R. EVID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (Proposed Rule 1973).
54 Orleans, How Primary Care Physicians Treat PsychiatricDisorders:A National Survey
of Family Practitioners, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 52 (1985).
-15 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146d

(1983).
EVID. CODE §§ 990-1007, 1010-26 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West
1979); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN..§ 9-109 (1984).
56 CAL.
57
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privilege statutes exist in states that do not recognize a
physician-patient privilege 58 and also exist in many states
that do recognize a physician-patient privilege. 59 The
psychologist-patient privileges require the patient to consult a licensed psychologist for treatment of a mental or
emotional problem. Sometimes explicit, 60 but other times
implicit, is the requirement that the psychologist be a
clinical psychologist6 1 rather than an industrial or educational psychologist.
Psychotherapist-patient privileges generally combine
the psychiatrist and psychologist-patient privileges, however they are, in some instances, broader. While specialized psychiatrist-patient privileges include only treatment
by a psychiatric physician, psychotherapist-patient privileges may include the treatment of a mental or emotional
problem by a non-psychiatric physician.62
One question raised by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is whether non-psychiatric or psychological therapists should be included. 63 The psychotherapist-patient
privilege potentially could include marriage counselors,
drug and alcohol counselors, psychiatric social workers
and various lay therapists. A more broadly drawn provision could also include friends and relatives who provide
sage advice or soft shoulders. 64 Most psychotherapist-patient privileges do not include a non-physician or psychol58

ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN.

STAT.

§ 52-146 (c) (1983).

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5306 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1984-85); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 337.055 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
- CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c(a) (1983).
61 See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 216, at 607 (1978).
62 FED.
R. EvID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 180, 242 (Proposed Rule 1973); FLA. STAT.
59

§ 90.503 (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN., N.M.R. EvID. 504 (udicial Pamphlet 10 1978).
69 Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1050 (1973); Note,
The Social Worker-Client Relationship and Privileged Communications, 1965 WASH.
ANN.

U.L.Q. 362.
- Krattemaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Court: An Alternative to the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1973).
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ogist-patient privilege 65 or include special privileges for
these other therapists.6 6
The pattern of requirements for recognition of a psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychotherapist-patient privilege is the same as for the physician-patient privilege.
Someone seeking treatment must consult the appropriate
type of therapist and communicate with them in confidential fashion on a topic necessarily related to treatment.
Similarly, the same pattern of waiver and exclusion exceptions exists. There are certain problems, however, which
are unique to these privileges.
As noted above, the identity of the patient is not generally protected from disclosure under the physician-patient
privilege.6 7 Because being identified as the patient of a
psychiatrist or psychologist is thought to be a source of
embarrassment and stigma,68 it is argued that these privileges should cloak the identity of the patient as well as the
substance of the communications. 69 Most jurisdictions
70
have not accepted this argument.
Group therapy, one form of treatment used by some
71
psychiatrists, psychologists and other psychotherapists,
presents another unique problem. Because the presence
of someone other than the therapist and the patient is
thought to imply an absence of confidentiality, most privilege statutes do not protect communications during
group therapy sessions. Based upon the argument that
group therapy is an effective and comparatively inexpensive form of therapy in which patients become each
others' therapists, it has been argued that group therapy
61 But see, NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.215.2 (1979) (includes psychiatric social worker
in definition of doctor).
- MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1043 (West 1976) (marriage counselors);
N.Y.C. Pub. L. 12, § 4508 (social workers).
67 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

See Shuman & Weiner, supra note 8.
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 11 § 504[04], at 504-23.
70 But see Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1981).
7, L. KOVEL, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THERAPY 162 (1976).

6
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should be included within these privileges.72 Acceptance
of this argument is limited,73 perhaps because even if the
privilege applies to the psychiatrist's or psychologist's testimony, the mouths of the other patients are not necessarily shut.

IV.

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT RULE

Physician, psychiatrist, psychologist and psychotherapist-patient privileges apply only when the relationship
has, at least as one of its purposes, treatment of the patient or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment. Thus,
when the purpose of the relationship is not at all treatment, but preparation for expert testimony or assistance
in preparation of the case, an attempt to cloak these communications under the physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychotherapist-patient privilege will not be
successful. Viewing these communications from the perspective of the attorney-client relationship and the privilege accorded it, however, may yield a different result.
A.

Civil Proceedings

The attorney-client privilege, which was recognized at
common law, has traditionally been thought to apply to
confidential communications between attorney and client
on the subject of legal services. Communications between
the attorney and the attorney's assistant or potential witness have not been included within the traditional contemplation of this privilege, yet, have nonetheless been
found deserving of protection. The work product doctrine, which received recognition in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor74 and is amplified by rules of procedure incorporating this concept, 75
72 Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants and Group Psychotherapy,
1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 191.

73
74

State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984).
329 U.S. 497 (1947).

75 FED.

R. Civ; P. 26(b) (3), (4).
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has been an additional source of protection. Hickman limited discovery by the defendant of the written statements
of prospective witnesses and memoranda of oral statements obtained by the plaintiffs attorney to a limited set
of circumstances designed to prevent disclosure of the attorney's thought processes and to limit disclosure of written statements of witnesses to circumstances of
76
necessity.

One question not addressed in Hickman v. Taylor was
the discovery of expert witnesses retained by an adverse
party in preparation for trial. This question has now been
addressed for civil actions in the federal courts by the
1970 amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is more cautious in its approach
than many state rules.77 It states:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known
and opinions held by experts, ofherwise discoverable
under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for
trial, may be obtained as follows:
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any
other party to identify each person whom the other party
expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify,
and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to
which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of
the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court
may order further discovery by other means, subject to
such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant
to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and
expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation
for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing
76

329 U.S.

77

C.

(1970).

at 509-14.

WRIGHT &

A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2029, at 241
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of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court
shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the ex-

pert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under subdiviions (b)(4)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4) (A) (ii) of this rule the court may require,
and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision
(b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party

seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.78
This rule addresses the discovery of two categories of experts, those expected to be called as witness at trial and
those utilized in case preparation and not expected to be
called as a witness at trial.
Regarding those individuals whom the opposing party
may call as a witness at trial, a chronology for discovery is
prescribed. First, Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) permits a demand
of the opposing party by interrogatory of the identity of
each proposed expert expected to be called, the subject
matter of the expert's testimony, and the substance of the
facts and opinions as to which the expert will testify and a
summary of the grounds for each opinion. Some courts
have interpreted the identity requirement to include sufficient information to identify and locate this individual.79
The duty to supplement responses of Rule 26(e) applies
here, making insufficient the response at trial that it was
decided to use this expert only after responding to the
interrogatory. 80 Failure to list an expert in answer to this
interrogatory may result in a restriction of the expert's
testimony. 8 '
Following the interrogatory stage of discovery, under
7s FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
7'

Mann v. Newport Tankers Corp., 96 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

so FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(e).

8, Simonsen v. Barlo Plastics Co., 551 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1977).
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26(b)(4)(ii) a party may move for further discovery of an
expert, typically by deposition; however, the court may
also order the production of documents. 2 The court's
order permitting this additional discovery should contain
a provision for reasonable compensation of the expert by
the party seeking discovery and may restrict the scope or
sequence. However, no showing of substantial need or
good cause for this subsequent state of discovery needs to
be shown.84
Discovery under 26(b)(4)(B) of experts retained by an
opponent, but not intended to be called at trial, is severely limited. An opposing party may, in most courts,
discover the names and addresses of these experts, 85 but
may discover relevant facts and opinions in the possession
of these individuals only if this information is not reasonably available elswhere or as provided in Rule 35(b).8 6
This limitation applies to formal discovery only, thus to
the extent that the expert retained by a party is willing to
talk informally with the opposing party, the discovery
rules have no application. If the expert is consulted but
not retained or expected to be called as a witness, no disclosure of even the expert's identity need occur.8 7
Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves a request for the report of a court ordered examination by the examined party, which triggers a
corresponding obligation by the requesting party to turn
over any reports of examinations made before or after for
the same condition. 8 For example, even if the plaintiff
82 In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 77 F.R.D. 39 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).
83 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).

8
Herbst v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975); United
States v.John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich. 1971). But see Wilson
v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
85 Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976). But see Ager
v.Jane C. Storment Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir.
1980).
86 FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b).

87

Baki v. B.F. Diamond Const. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976).

88

FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b).
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did not intend to call as a witness Dr. Gonzales, a psychologist who examined his client and prepared a report to
help prepare for trial, if the plaintiff is examined under
Rule 35 at the defendant's request by Dr. Schwartz, a psychiatrist, and the plaintiff requests and receives a copy of
Dr. Schwartz's report, the plaintiff is obligated to deliver,
upon request, a copy of Dr. Gonzales' report to the defendant. If Dr. Gonzales provides assistance to the plaintiff's attorney without conducting an examination of the
plaintiff, by suggesting topics for cross examining the defendant's expert for example, the reciprocity provisions of
35(b) are not triggered.89
The other circumstance under which experts not intended to be called are discoverable is "upon a showing
of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. '"90 This
provision applies to the situation in which expertise on
the subject of the litigation is severely limited and one
party has prevented the opponent from utilizing an expert
by retaining him for trial preparation but not testimony.
For example, in Dixon v. Cappellini,91 an action against a
deprogrammer by a "church" member, psychiatric and
psychological reports of treatment received by the plaintiff shortly after the deprogramming were found to be
unique and contain relevant information not otherwise
obtainable by the defendants following institution of the
lawsuit eight months later.92 The court questioned inclusion of the reports as trial preparation materials, but explained the treatment which should be given these reports
if governed by Rule 26(b)(4). 9
Witnesses who may qualify as experts but whose knowledge was not gained in anticipation of the instant litiga89

Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974).

o FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).

91 88 F.R.D. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
92

Id. at 3.

9'

Id.
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tion are not addressed by Rule 26(b)(4).94 For example,
the defendant psychiatrist or psychologist in an action for
malpractice may be sent interrogatories or subjected to
95
depositions in the same manner as any other defendant.
B.

Criminal Proceedings

Most courts recognize that communications between
the defendant in a criminal proceeding and a psychiatrist
or psychologist not treating the defendant but retained to
assist in preparation for trial should be privileged, if at all,
under the attorney-client privilege and not a medical privilege.9 6 The extension of the attorney-client privilege in
criminal cases to communications between a defendant
and a psychiatrist or psychologist retained to assist in case
preparation is governed largely by case law. Frequently
these cases involve a psychiatrist or psychologist consulted by the defense on the viability of an insanity defense who renders an opinion unfavorable to the
defendant which the prosecution discovers and seeks to
introduce into evidence.
Most courts have little problem concluding that, in
criminal cases, the attorney-client privilege extends to
communications made to a psychiatrist or psychologist retained to assist in preparation of the case. 97 The difficulty
arises in determining whether, by raising the insanity defense, the privilege is impliedly waived as to the non-testifying psychiatrist or psychologist who rendered the
unfavorable opinion.
The majority of courts addressing this problem reject
the notion that raising the insanity defense waives the attorney-client privilege as to the retained non-testifying expert. 8 The rationale for this approach is that implying
91 Rodriguez v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. II (W.D. Pa. 1972).
95 Keith v. Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., 86 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Rodriguez v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. II (W.D. Pa. 1972).
- United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
97 Id.; People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, 531 P.2d 793, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975).
98 United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); People v. Lines, 13
Cal. 3d 500, 531 P.2d 793, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975); People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich.
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waiver would chill the defendant's willingness to confide
in these experts and thereby restrict the attorney's ability
to prepare and investigate the case for trial. Thus, in the
majority of American jurisdictions the defense may prevent compelled judicial disclosure of unfavorable pretrial
psychiatric and psychological examinations prepared at
the request of defense counsel.
The minority rule is that raising the insanity defense is
inconsistent with the retention of confidentiality in all relevant psychiatrist or psychologist-patient communications
whether sought to be cloaked by a medical privilege9 9 or
the attorney-client privilege 0 0 and results in a waiver of
any applicable privilege. Under this rule a privilege generally applies until the insanity defense is raised, thus a
decision not to raise this or related defenses prevents the
prosecution from discovering pretrial psychiatric or psychological examinations prepared at the request of defense counsel. Of course, even under the majority rule
once the defendant calls a psychiatrist or psychologist to
the witness stand, regardless of the previous attorney-client or medical privilege, a waiver occurs as to communications with that psychiatrist or psychologist. 10
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

In the absence of statutory privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychiatrist or psychologist and patient, an argument may be advanced in
favor of a constitutional right to privacy which cloaks confidential psychotherapist-patient communications. This
argument relies on such Supreme Court decisions as Roe
App. 543, 185 N.W.2d 831 (1971); State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417
(1957).
- People v. AI-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 307 N.E.2d 43, 351 N.Y.S.2d 969

(1973).
- State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982); People v. Edny, 39 N.Y.2d 620,
350 N.E.2d 400, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1976).

, Ballew v. State, 640 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
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v. Wade11 2 and Griswold v. Connecticut10 3 to support the conclusion that a constitutional zone of privacy may be found
relying upon various provisions in the Bill of Rights sufficient to protect against compelled disclosure of intimate
personal details and to protect autonomy in personal decision making, specifically the decision to consult a
psychotherapist. 104
The Supreme Court has not yet clearly accepted or rejected this contention. In Whalen v. Roe,'0 5 a challenge to
a New York computerized storage scheme for certain prescriptions, the Court concluded only that the New York
scheme did not "on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous
threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation." 10 6 Whether this conclusion should be read to support an implicit recognition of a zone of priviacy cloaking
physician-patient relations generally has yet to be clarified. There are, however, a number-of lower federal court
and state court decisions before and after Whalen which
address this issue.
The decisions can be grouped into three categories.
The first category includes cases which reject the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in psychotherapist-patient relationships. The second category
recognizes the existence of the right, but finds it should
not apply in the instant case. The third category of cases
recognizes the existence of the right and finds it should
apply in the instant case.
The rejection of a constitutional right of privacy cloaking psychiatrist-patient relationships is illustrated by Felber
v. Foote, 10 7 a challenge by a psychiatrist to a Connecticut
statutory scheme requiring disclosure of the names and
other information about drug dependent people to the
state commissioner of health. The federal district court
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
-o'
Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
05 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
1- Id.at 600.
107 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970).
102
103
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summarily rejected this challenge with the admonition
that there is no general constitutional right of privacy and
the specific recognitions of this right have not included
the physician-patient relationship. It is significant that
this case was decided before Roe v. Wade,' 08 which extended the right of privacy to a particular physician-patient relationship, that of a pregnant woman and her
physician, and also before Whalen v. Roe.' 0 9
The cases recognizing a constitutional right of privacy
cloaking the psychotherapist-patient relationship are subsequent to Roe v. Wade, involve a patient who entered
therapy prior to the litigation, and do not involve a plaintiff-patient. In re B, 10 for example, involved an attempt to
compel disclosure regarding treatment of a juvenile's
mother some years earlier, in the dispostional phase of a
delinquency proceeding. Relying on the state and federal
constitutions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that a right of privacy existed cloaking these past
treatments, but the same protection would not apply to
current voluntary evaluation by a court appointed
psychiatrist. "'
Hawaii Psychiatric Society v. Anyoshu" 2 involved an attempt to enjoin an investigation of fraud in the Hawaii
medicaid program which entailed a search of the records
of a clinical psychologist. The district court held that a
constitutional right of privacy cloaks the psychotherapistpatient relationship and in the absence of a compelling
state interest judicially compelled disclosure should not
occur." 3' Because nothing had yet suggested that this psychologist had engaged in fraud or that a search of this sort
of records was necessary to prevent fraud on a programatic level, the court enjoined the record search.
In the next category of cases the court recognized the
lo,410 U.S. 113 (1973).

429 U.S. 589 (1977).
394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978).
id. at 426.
1" 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979).
11 Id. at 1039.
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existence of a right of privacy, but concluded that its protections had been waived by the patient or a compelling
state interest in favor of disclosure existed. In re Lifshultz"' 4 involved a patient who initiated a personal injury
action and who received psychiatric care ten years earlier.
The Supreme Court of California recognized the existence of a right of privacy for psychotherapist-patient relationships, but found that this protection was waived by
the patient as to those conditions disclosed in bringing
the action.'" 5
Another illustration of this position is found in Lora v.
Board of Education of the City of New York,1 6 a suit challenging the placement of emotionally handicapped children.
There the plaintiffs sought to have their experts inspect
randomly selected student diagnostic and referral files
without student names or identifying information. In response to the school board's assertion of these students'
right to privacy, the court recognized the existence of the
right, but found that the need for the information in the
litigation to protect the interests of this class of students
and the protection against disclosure of the identity of in17
dividual students, justified limited disclosure.'
VI.

FEDERAL PROGAM LIMITATIONS

The federal government provides services and funding
for a number of programs designed to treat mental or
emotional disorders. Specific limitations on the disclosure of confidences made within treatment programs operated or funded by the federal government apply to
drug ' 8 and alcohol treatment progrms." 9 These limita114 2 Cal. 3d 478, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
See also Ceaser v.
Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976) (denying protection of psychotherapist-patient privilege to communication relevant to issues concerning mental or
emotional condition of patient if such was put in issue by the patient).
"15 In re Lifshultz, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 838-39, 467 P.2d 557, 567 (1970).
116 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
"' Id. at 574.
" 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (Supp. 1984).
119 Id.
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tions, although set forth in separate sections, create identical limitations. 120
Both sections operate much like a relational privilege to
12o

42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 provides:
Confidentiality of patient records
(a) Disclosure authorization
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any
patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of
any program or activity relating to alcoholism or alcohol abuse education, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by any
department or agency of the United States shall, except as provided
in subsection (e), be confidential and be disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Purposes and circumstances of disclosure affecting consenting
patient and patient regardless of consent
(1) The content of any record referred to in subsection (a) may be
disclosed in accordance with the prior written consent of the patient
with respect to whom such record is maintained, but only to such
extent, under such circumstances, and for such purposes as may be
allowed under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (g).
(2) Whether or not the patient, with respect to whom any given record referred to in subsection (a) of this section is maintained, gives
his written consent, the content of such record may be disclosed as
follows:
(A) To medical personnel to the extent necessary to meet a bona
fide medical emergency.
(B) To qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting scientific research, management audits, financial audits, or program evaluation, but such personnel may not identify, directly or indirectly,
any individual patient in any report of such research, audit, or evaluation, or otherwise disclose patient identities in any manner.
(C) If authorized by an appropriate order of a court of competent
jurisdiction granted after application showing good cause therefor.
In assessing good cause the court shall weigh the public interest and
the need for disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the treatment services. Upon the
granting of such order, the court, in determining the extent to which
any disclosure of all or any part of any record is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.
(c) Prohibition against use of record in making criminal charges or
investigation of patient
Except as authorized by a court order granted under subsection
(b)(2)(C) of this section, no record referred to in subsection (a) may
be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient.
(d) Continuing prohibition against disclosure irrespective of status
as patient
The prohibitions of this section continue to apply.to records con-
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limit compelled judicial disclosure of records of a patient's identity, diagnosis, prognosis or treatment in a
drug or alcohol program conducted, regulated or assisted
by the federal government. Two exceptions apply in the
context of judicial disclosure, written consent by the patient and a court order based upon a showing of good
cause. The statute directs a court in gauging good cause
to weigh the public interests in favor of disclosure against
its consequence to this and other patients' treatment.
A number of decisions, particularly in the field of drug
treatment, have addressed the court-ordered disclosure
exception. Disclosure under this section should be extremely limited and where other sources of similar evidence exist, disclosure should not occur.' 2' When no
other similar evidence is available and the public interest
in the outcome is substantial, as for example in child
22
abuse or neglect cases, disclosure may be ordered.
cerning any individual who has been a patient, irrespective of
whether or when he ceases to be a patient.
(e) Armed Forces and Veterans' Administration; interchange of
records
The prohibitions of this section do not apply to any interchange of
records

-

(1) within the Armed Forces or within those components of the
Veterans' Administration furnishing health care to veterans, or
(2) between such components and the Armed Forces.
(f) Penalty for first and subsequent offenses
Any person who violates any provision of this section or any regulation issued pursuant to this section shall be fined not more than
$500 in the case of a first offense, and not more that $5,000 in the
case of each subsequent offense.
(g) Regulations of Secretary; definitions, safeguards, and procedures, including procedures and criteria for issuance and scope of
orders
Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, the Secretary
shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this section.
These regulations may contain such definitions, and may provide for
such safeguards and procedures, including procedures and criteria
for the issuance and scope of orders under subsection (b)(2)(C) as in
the judgment of the Secretary are necessary or proper to effectuate
the purposes of this section, to prevent circumvention or evasion
thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.

ld.
21
122

United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1314 (8th Cir. 1977).
In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111,293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
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Frequently, this issue arises in prosecution for drug-related offenses when the government's case against a participant in the drug treatment program has been assisted
by a co-patient.123 Although regulations have been
promulgated formally prohibiting the employment or enrollment of undercover agents in these programs, 24 the
problem continues. The cases seek to draw fine distinctions by concluding that the informant was not there to
ferret out drug offenses 25 or that the statute limits disclosure of records but not 1an
informant's testimony not
26
based upon these records.
1United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1977); Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App.3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976); State v. Keleher, 5
Kan. App. 2d 400, 617 P.2d 1265 (1980).
12
42 C.F.R. § 2.19 provides:
Undercover agents and informants - Rules.
(a) Definitions. As used in this section, § 2.19-1, and §§ 2.67 and

2.67-1,

-

(1) The term "undercover agent" means a member of Federal, State,
or local law enforcement or investigative agency whose identity as
such is concealed from either the patients or personnel of a program
in which he enrolls or attempts to enroll.
(2) The term "informant" means a person who, at the request of any
Federal, State, or local law enforcement or investigative agency or
officer, carries on observation of one or more persons enrolled in or
employed by a program in which he is enrolled or employed, for the
purpose of reporting to such agency or officer information concerning such persons which he obtains as a result of such observation
subsequent to such request.
(b) Generalprohibition Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c)
of this section, or as specifically authorized by a court order granted
under § 2.67 (1) No undercover agent or informant may be employed by or enrolled in any alcohol or drug abuse treatment program;
(2) No supervisor or other person having authority over an undercover agent may knowingly permit such agent to be or remain employed by or enrolled in any such program; and
(3) No law enforcement or investigative officer may recruit or retain
an informant with respect to such a program.
(c) Exceptions. The enrollment of a law enforcement officer in a treatment program shall not be deemed a violation of this section if (1)
such enrollment is solely for the purpose of enabling the officer to
obtain treatment for his own abuse of alcohol or drugs, and (2) his
status as a law enforcement officer is known to the program director.
42 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1984).
125 United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1977).
1'2 State v. Keleher, 5 Kan. App. 2d 400, 617 P.2d 1265 (1980); State v. Bethea,
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CONCLUSION

Although evidence resulting from communications between psychiatrists or psychologists and their patients
may be highly probative in a lawsuit, societal concerns
with privacy have resulted in limits on judicial access to
this evidence. Because the rationale for these limits and
its pervasiveness varies from one context to the next, a
maze of rules and exceptions limiting disclosures of psychiatrist or psychologist-patient communications has
evolved. An attorney will not know from case to case
whether he wishes these doors to be closed or open, and
must learn both how they open and close.

35 N.C. App. 512, 241 S.E.2d 869 (1978); Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976).

